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Abstract 
 
The article’s main objective is to investigate the empirical link between the fiscal balance and 
the  current  account  (i.e.  the  twin  deficits  phenomenon).  The  article  focuses  on  transition 
economies which are according to their different characteristics divided into three major 
groups, i.e. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In fact, the inconsistency between public sector 
instability and currency overvaluations which led to current account balance deterioration 
was denoted as one of the key determinants of the balance of payments (currency) crisis seen 
in  transition  economies  like  Czech  Republic  (1997)  and  Russia  (1998).  Moreover,  the 
importance of the so-called Horioka-Feldstein puzzle in transition economies is examined in 
order to draw some conclusions about the regions’ integration with international capital 
markets.  For  this  purpose,  pooled  cross-sectional  and  time-series  techniques  are  used  to 
characterize the properties of current account variations across selected groups of transition 
economies in the 1990-2003 period. The empirical results suggest that high budget deficits in 
transition countries have signaled relatively low level of substitutability between private and 
public savings, implying a relatively high correlation between fiscal and external imbalances. 
Accordingly, special emphasis should be paid to the fiscal policy shift in these economies. 
Indeed,  the  main  element  of  the  economic  policy  reversal  in  transition  countries  should 
involve a substantial reduction of fiscal deficits in the future in order to reduce the probability 
of a balance of payments (currency) crisis. Finally, the article provides some evidence of the 
existence of the Horioka-Feldstein puzzle in transition economies. 
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In the last decade, many financial crises have emerged and induced substantial welfare losses 
for economies such as the Mexican (1994), Asian (1997), Brazilian (1999) and Argentinean 
crises (2001). Moreover, even transition economies have not been immune to some form of a 
‘balance  of  payment  crisis’  (or  currency  crisis).  In  fact,  along  with  a  number  of  capital 
account liberalizations the enhanced macroeconomic stability combined with decisively pro-
Western  and  pro-market-oriented  economic  policy  and  rhetoric  made  many  transition 
economies  the  darlings  of  international  investors.  Nevertheless,  these  trends  made  these 
economies increasingly more vulnerable and in some cases ended in a currency crisis, as in 
Czech  Republic  (1997)  and  Russia  (1998)  where  a  worsening  of  certain  macroeconomic 
fundamentals and political instability were identified. In fact, in line with the first-generation 
models (Krugman, 1979) the inconsistency between public sector  instability and currency 
overvaluations which led to a current account balance deterioration was denoted as one of the 
major determinants of the currency crisis in these economies. Eventually, the main internal 
factor contributing to the Russian crisis was the persistent failure to bring fiscal problems 
under control. The lack of commitment to fiscal reform at the highest political levels, political 
opposition to such reform, the lack of co-operation by regional governments, the lax control 
over spending (particularly in the military area), and the emergence of influential oligarchs 
unwilling to share the tax burden all helped stifle the pace of fiscal reform (McGettigan, 
2000).    3
 
The  extent  to  which  variations  in  the  stance  of  fiscal  policy  can  lead  to  predictable 
developments in an open country’s performance in the current account of the balance of 
payments  remains  a  controversial  issue.  Generally,  two  competing  views  exist  to  explain 
variations  in  the  current  account  as  a  consequence  of  public  sector  (in)stability.  The 
traditional view argues that general government budget deficits cause current account deficits. 
In fact, public sector activity can have both direct and indirect effects on the current account 
balance. Construction projects by the public sector may require imports of investment goods, 
thereby exerting a direct influence on the external balance. Simultaneously, public sector 
activities affect total demand in the economy and an increase in them can also have some 
psychological effect. In addition, financing budget deficits by issuing bonds leads to higher 
consumption expenditure due to wealth effects and they raise interest rates. Ceteris paribus, 
these  higher  interest  rates  appreciate  the  currency  and,  because  of  the  resulting  loss  in 
competitiveness, worsen the current account balance. The traditional view is challenged by 
adherents to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (Barro, 1989) which states that an increase 
in a budget deficit (through reduced taxes) will be offset by increases in private savings, 
insofar as the private sector full discounts the future tax liabilities associated with financing 
the fiscal deficit.   
 
It is not only developed economies like the US that seem to suffer from a twin deficit problem 
since several developing economies, including transition economies, are also experiencing 
deficits in both the government budget and current account balance. So far, empirical studies 
have mainly concentrated on the US and other developed economies. Therefore, empirical 
work to analyze data from different developing economies is needed, in particular for the so 
far  mainly  neglected  transition  economies,  i.e.  the  27  economies  of  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe (CEE), Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States  (CIS).  In  line  with  this,  the  article  builds  on  the  work  of  Fidermuc  (2003)  who 
investigated evidence of the twin deficits phenomenon and the so-called Horioka-Feldstein 
puzzle in a wide range of economies, including three transition economies, by modifying his 
analysis to transition economies only and applying different econometric approaches.  
 
Accordingly, the article’s primary aim is to provide an empirical characterization of the twin 
deficit problem and to consider some policy implications of a possible twin deficit as well as 
any evidence of the Horioka-Feldstein puzzle in the different blocks of transition economies 
(CEE, SEE and CIS). In fact, almost all transition economies have experienced large deficits 
in both balances since the start of the transition process. On one hand transition economies 
collapsed, prompting the government to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy in the form of 
increased  expenditures  (to  build  up  social  and  physical  infrastructure)  and  extended  tax 
incentives to encourage investment. Moreover, fiscal deficits expanded as governments tried 
to absorb the revenue and expenditure pressure associated with the sharp falls in GDP and 
fiscal restructuring. On the other hand, current account deficits jumped to record high levels 
in some economies mainly due to the low level of exports, consisting predominately of low 
valued  agricultural  and  primary  goods  as  well  as  uncompetitive  manufacturing  goods.  In 
addition, due to the regional pickup in growth and investment and other factors (e.g. real 
exchange rate appreciation), substantial external deficits also reflect high levels of imported 
consumer and capital goods, whereby the latter were needed to introduce new technology and 
make industry more efficient.  
 
To summarize, a brief descriptive analysis supports the hypothesis of the high probability of 
the existence of the twin deficit phenomenon in transition economies. Nevertheless, a robust,   4
positive  and  statistically  significant  medium-term  relationship  between  the  government 
budget balance and the current account balance should be tested to confirm or reject this 
hypothesis. Moreover, the relationship between the current account and investment should 
provide some evidence of the degree of transition economies’ integration with international 
capital markets.  
 
The article is organized as follows. The next chapter of the article contains a discussion of 
some theoretical issues, in particular the twin deficits hypothesis, germane to the empirical 
modeling of the current account. Chapter 2 summarizes trends and developments in current 
account and fiscal imbalances in transition economies. The empirical framework and results 
from the pooled cross-sectional and time-series data estimations with a variety of robustness 
tests are presented in Chapter 3. The final section provides concluding remarks and some 
policy implications.     
 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Simple national accounting identities help shed light on the macroeconomic determinants of 
current account fluctuations. According to the absorption theory of the balance of payments 
(Alexander, 1952), the current account is the excess of gross national product (GNPt) over 
absorption (At):      
 
CAt = GNPt – (Ct + Gt + It) = GNPt – At    ( 1 )  
 
where Ct, Gt, and It stand for private consumption, government purchases and investment. In 
addition,  note  that  the  difference  between  a  country’s  national  product  and  private  and 
government  consumption  is  national  savings  that  are  the  sum  of  private  and  government 
savings. As a result, the current account is also equal to the  difference between national 
savings, St, and investment: 
 




t I S − + (Tt - Gt)      ( 2 )  
       
where a current account surplus must be matched by a private sector surplus ( p
t S > p
t I ) and/or 
public-sector surplus (Tt > Gt). By analogy, a current account deficit must be matched by a 
private sector deficit and/or public sector deficit (i.e. the ‘twin deficit’ problem). When an 
economy starts to run a current account deficit, policymakers will want to see whether there 
has been a decrease in (private) savings, increase in investment, and/or increase in the budget 
deficit. However, there is a sound reason to worry about a country’s long-term prospects if the 
onset of the current account deficit reflects lower (private) savings or a larger budget deficit.
1 
In both cases, the country is borrowing abroad or running down its foreign assets to sustain or 
raise consumption, whether by the private sector or the public sector. Yet there is less cause to 
worry when the onset of a current account deficit reflects an increase in investment. Namely, 
the country is then raising its capital stock more quickly and therefore raising its future output 
faster.            
 
                                                 
1 Proponents of the so-called Lawson doctrine emphasized that an increase in a current account deficit that 
results from a shift in private sector behavior should not be a matter of concern at all. On the other hand, the 
public budget balance is a matter of public policy concern and the focus should be on this (Corden, 1994). 
Nevertheless,  several  financial  crises,  like  Mexico  (1994),  occurred  despite  the  absence  of  large  fiscal 
imbalances.     5
Suppose that current taxes are held constant and ( p
t S – p
t I ) remains the same and stable, an 
increase in temporary purchases will raise the government budget deficit (Gt – Tt) which in 
turn  affects  the  current  account.  In  this  way,  a  government  budget  deficit  resulting  from 
increased purchases reduces the nation’s current account surplus or widens a nation’s current 
account deficit (Abel and Bernanke, 2001). Another aspect of the twin deficits phenomenon 
could  be  the  positive  effect  of  budget  deficits  on  interest  rates.  In  fact,  in  a  small  open 
economy an increase in the budget deficit leads to an increase in interest rates. The increase in 
interest rates induces capital inflows leading to an appreciation of domestic currency. A twin 
deficits situation arises as the appreciation deteriorates net exports and, in turn, worsens the 
current account (Kearney and Monadjemi, 1990).
2 
 
On the other hand, many economists support the alternative view (intertemporal approach) 
exemplified by the Ricardian theory (see Barro, 1989) and suggest that the decline in public 
saving  is  offset  by  an  equal  increase  in  private  saving,  and  that  national  saving  remains 
unaffected. In other words, the proponents of Ricardian equivalence stress that, in order to 
analyze macroeconomic phenomena, it is necessary to take into account the intertemporal 
saving and investment decisions of the private sector. In these models, the current account is 
viewed as the solution to a dynamic optimization problem where the objective is to allocate 
consumption optimally over time. The current account balance is seen as the change in net 
assets of an economy. In addition, the government budget deficit is the result of a cut in 
current  taxes,  with  current  and  planned  future  government  purchases  unchanged.  With 
government  purchases,  Gt,  unchanged  and  with  output,  Yt,  held  constant  at  its  full-
employment  level,  the  tax  cut  will  cause  national  saving  to  fall  only  if  it  causes  private 
consumption, Ct, to rise.   
 
In  fact,  the  proponents  of  Ricardian  equivalence  argue  that  lump-sum  tax  changes  (with 
current  and  future  government  purchases  held  constant)  will  not  affect  consumption  or 
national savings. These economists argue that a cut in taxes today forces the government to 
borrow more to pay for its current purchases; when this extra borrowing plus interest is repaid 
in the future then future taxes will have to rise. Thus, although a tax cut raises consumers’ 
current after-tax incomes the tax cut creates the need for higher future taxes and lowers the 
after-tax incomes that consumers can expect to receive in future. If the Ricardian equivalence 
proposition is true, a budget deficit resulting from a tax cut will have no effect on the current 
account because it does not affect national savings.
3  
 
In  recent  years  many  theoretical  and  empirical  researches  into  the  external  balance  have 
concentrated on the intertemporal approach to the current account, where levels of investment 
and  saving  need  not  to  be  correlated  (Obstfeld  and  Rogoff,  1996).  According  to  this 
intertemporal approach, the economy can finance large investment or government budgetary 
needs or equalize positive productivity shocks by external (negative) imbalances which fit the 
situation in transition economies. Therefore, for the transition economies a relatively high 
correlation between current account and investment is expected, implying some evidence of 
gradual integration into international financial markets.
4 Moreover, Miller (2002) argues that 
                                                 
2 Several studies supported the twin deficits hypothesis, such as Darrat (1988) and Bachman (1992) for the USA, 
Vamvoukas (1997) for Greece, Kulkarni et al. (2001) for Mexico, India and Pakistan, Islam (1998) for Brazil, 
Akbostanci et al. (2001) for Turkey, and Fidermuc (2003) for Hungary and Poland.   
3 The empirical evidence of Ricardian equivalence was found in Great Britain by Ahmed (1987) and in the USA 
by Miller and Russek (1989). 
4 Feldstein and Horioka’s (1980) findings suggest that saving and investment are highly correlated (with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.89) for 16 OECD economies over the 1960-1974 period. The results imply that even   6
the relatively high positive correlation between investment and savings reflects the idea of 
endogenous  fiscal  policy.  In  fact,  in  several  transition  economies  the  current  account 
deteriorated via an increase in investment. Generally, the home government responded to 
these current account deficits with a decrease in government expenditure and/or an increase in 
taxes; i.e. higher government saving. Consequently, the endogenous fiscal policy probably 
creates a strong positive relationship between saving and investment in transition economies.     
       
 
3. Current Account and Fiscal Imbalances in Transition Economies 
 
3.1. Current account imbalances in transition economies 
 
Table 1:  Saving/Investment Imbalances in Transition Economies 
(in percentage of GDP; unweighted average) 
 




























            
Czech R.  -3.9  -1.4  -2.7  0.5  -3.4  -1.5  -3.4  -4.8  -4.2 
Estonia  -4.3  -7.8  -6.1  -0.1  -0.4  -0.2  -4.4  -8.2  -6.3 
Hungary  -1.8  -2.3  -2  -3.5  -5.4  -4.5  -5.3  -7.7  -6.5 
Latvia  5.5  -6.8  -0.7  -1.0  -2.2  -1.6  4.5  -9.0  -2.3 
Lithuania  -2.7  -3.9  -3.4  -4.1  -3.6  -3.8  -6.8  -7.5  -7.2 
Poland  0.5  -0.8  -0.2  -2.9  -3.4  -3.1  -2.4  -4.2  -3.3 
Slovakia  0.6  -2  -0.8  -4.1  -4.0  -4.0  -3.5  -6.0  -4.8 
Slovenia  2.0  0.6  1.3  0.2  -1.4  -0.6  2.2  -0.8  0.7 
CEE   0.0  -3.0  -1.5  -1.8  -3.0  -2.4  -1.8  -6.0  -3.9 
                    
Albania  -9.2  2.8  -3.2  -14.4  -8.9  -11.6  -23.6  -6.1  -14.8 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  -19  -11  -14  -1.7  -4.1  -3.3  -20.7  -15.1  -17.3 
Bulgaria  6.2  -4.9  0.6  -6.9  -0.4  -3.6  -0.7  -5.3  -3.0 
Croatia  -2.4  -0.8  -1.7  -1.6  -5.2  -3.4  -4.0  -6.0  -5.1 
Macedonia  0.8  -3  -1.1  -4.8  -2.4  -3.6  -4.0  -5.4  -4.7 
Romania  -2.0  -1.3  -1.6  -3.4  -3.5  -3.5  -5.4  -4.8  -5.1 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  n. a.  -4.4  -4.8  n. a.  -2.6  -2.6  -8.0  -7.0  -7.4 
SEE  -3.9  -3.2  -3.6  -5.9  -3.9  -4.9  -9.8  -7.1  -8.5 
                    
Armenia  1.4  -8.9  -3.6  -18.1  -4.0  -11.0  -16.7  -12.9  -14.6 
Azerbaijan  -13.8  -12.9  -12.9  -6.0  -1.9  -3.9  -19.8  -14.8  -16.8 
Belarus  -3.8  -2.1  -2.8  -3.2  -1.4  -2.3  -7.0  -3.5  -5.1 
Georgia  -7.4  -3.6  -5.6  -13.1  -3.8  -8.4  -20.5  -7.4  -14.0 
Kazakhstan  -4.3  -0.2  -2.2  -4.9  -1.6  -3.3  -9.2  -1.8  -5.5 
Kyrgyz  -4.3  -0.2  -1.7  -9.3  -8.0  -8.7  -13.6  -8.2  -10.4 
Moldavia  1.0  -8.2  -3.7  -10.2  -1.1  -5.6  -9.2  -9.3  -9.3 
Russia  10.2  9.1  9.7  -7.4  0.6  -3.4  2.8  9.7  6.3 
Tajikistan  -3.5  -4.1  -3.3  -11.8  -1.1  -6.5  -15.3  -5.2  -9.8 
Turkmenistan  13.5  -6  3.8  -3.1  -0.9  -2.0  10.4  -6.9  1.8 
Ukraine  8.3  4.5  7  -11.2  -0.5  -5.8  -2.9  4.0  1.2 
Uzbekistan  4.0  2.3  3.3  -7.6  -1.4  -4.5  -3.6  0.9  -1.2 
CIS  1.3  -2.5  -0.6  -8.8  -2.1  -5.5  -7.5  -4.6  -6.1 
            
ALL TRANSITION  -0.9  -2.9  -1.9  -5.5  -3.0  -4.3  -6.4  -5.9  -6.2 
                                                                                                                                                          
among  industrial  economies  capital  mobility  is  substantially  limited.  Nevertheless,  many  economists  (e.g. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Miller, 2002, and Levy, 2003) disagree with this interpretation. In fact, many studies 
(e.g. Hutchison and Singh, 1993, Popper, 1990) showed that capital mobility among developed economies is 
very high. Hence, a strong relationship between saving and investment cannot be useful for measuring the extent 
of international capital mobility. Accordingly, Levy (2003) points out that it is merely just a test of a country’s 




Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
The overview of the current account balance in transition economies shows that, with the 
exception of Russia – a major commodity exporter, the opening up to external trade has been 
accompanied by significant current account deficits (see Table 1). In CEE the current account 
balances were not problematic with even a moderate positive balance as a share of GDP up 
until 1994 (averaging around 1 percent of GDP), reflecting contractions in domestic demand, 
real exchange rate undervaluations and external financing constraints. Afterwards, significant 
current account deficit deterioration was noticed in the region, peaking at almost 7 percent of 
GDP in 1998 on average (e.g. Lithuania (11.7), Latvia (10.7) and Slovakia (9.6)), mostly as a 
result of growing imports of both consumption and investment goods. Moreover, the gradual 
growth of the current account deficit in the CEE region reflects a combination of long-term 
growth  and  structural  factors,  external  shocks  and  domestic  policies.  More  precisely,  the 
deterioration of current accounts in the region was the result of the growth of merchandise 
trade  deficits,  downward  trends  in  the  service  balance,  rising  indebtedness  and  profit 
repatriation  as  well  as  the  consequence  of  the  continuous  real  appreciation  of  domestic 
currency in most of the examined cases.
5  
 
Figure 1: Average current account balance (CA), fiscal balance (GB) and private 





































































                                                 
5  In  transition  economies  a  large  part  of  real  appreciation  accounts  for  the  real  appreciation  that  reflects 
productivity gains in the tradable sector (due to the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect) This trend is commonly the 
case in fast growing economies, like transition economies, where the catch-up process is driven mainly by 
increasingly productive tradable sector. For example, Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) estimated that B-S effects in 
(19 selected) transition economies were between 0.7-1.2 percent, p.a., over the 1990-1998 period. Moreover, the 
dynamics of the real exchange rate in several CEE and SEE economies in the process of accession to the 
European Union can now be assimilated to those of previously acceding countries such as Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, with the B-S effect playing a dominant role in the later stages of their transition. 
 
   8
 
Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
Similar but even more intensive current account deficit dynamics were seen in the CIS region 
by  achieving  the  top  average  current  account  deficit  at  a  significantly  higher  level  (13.7 
percent  of  GDP)  than  the  CEE  region  in  1998.  The  major  contributors  to  such  a  huge 
deterioration in the current account balance were some economies in the region with current 
account deficits above 20 percent of GDP (e.g. Turkmenistan (37.4), Azerbaijan (30.7) etc.). 
Several  factors  contributed  to  this  development.  First,  many  countries  in  the  region 
experienced large losses in their terms of trade as prices for energy imports from the former 
Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (CMEA)  trading  partners  moved  to  market-
determined levels. Second, these countries ran high negative fiscal imbalances as authorities 
tried to absorb the revenue and expenditure pressure associated with sharp falls in national 
income and fiscal restructuring (see Table 1). Third, as a result of slow progress in building a 
competitive and diversified export sector trade liberalization  mainly stimulated imports of 
consumer goods and services. As a response to the Russian crisis the average current account 
deficits narrowed in the group. However, in many cases the deficits remained high – around 
or even above 10 percent of GDP (Azerbaijan (15.9), Armenia (8.1) etc.) on average in the 
recent 2001-2003 period. On the other hand, the SEE region achieved the highest average 
current account deficit with around 20 percent of GDP in 1992 due to the enormous deficit in 
Albania  (68.5  percent).  Later  these  huge  external  imbalances  improved  significantly. 
However, at the beginning of the second half of the 1990s and in the first years of the 21st 
century they again deteriorated. Eventually, the average current account deficit was at 8.2 
percent of GDP in the 2001-2003 period in comparison to the previous three years when it 
averaged out at 5.9 percent of GDP (see Figure 1).      
 
3.1.1. Development in investment and saving rates in transition economies 
 
At the start of transition more than a decade ago the investment-to-GDP ratio in all transition 
economies practically bottomed out in line with the drop in output (see Figure 2). Moreover, 
much of the capital stock at that time became obsolete overnight. Afterwards, investment 
rebounded particularly in the CEE region (an average of some 28 percent of GDP in 1998) 
when  economies  intensively  struggled  to  transform  their  economies  into  market-oriented 
ones. Nevertheless, the rise in total investment in most transition economies during the 1990s 
was largely concentrated in the business sector. In fact, in most transition economies average 
government capital expenditure was less than 5 percent of GDP in the period. However, as 
part of the process of real convergence, the investment ratio, also including public investment, 
may have to rise further to maintain strong economic growth.  
 
The various structural reforms being undertaken in transition economies should lead to an 
increase  in  the  marginal  productivity  of  domestic  investment.  Consequently,  the  further 
reform  of  financial  markets,  particularly  in  the  SEE  and  CIS  regions  with  respective 
investment  rates  of  only  around  13  and  18  percent  of  GDP  in  the  2001-2003  period  are 
needed  to  ensure  efficient  and  productive  capital  allocation.  Moreover,  in  order  to  spur 
growth  potential  and  boost  the  capacity  to  service  future  debt  repayments  in  transition 
economies,  external  borrowing  for  investment  purposes  is  preferred  to  borrowing  for 
consumption purposes. In this respect, capital inflows, in particular FDI, have been crucial in 
supporting these economies’ stronger investment needs. In fact, for transition economies it 
may be optimal to attract foreign savings and direct them to productive investment. Data 
suggest that CEE has been the most successful region with net FDI averaging out at almost 5 
percent of GDP, whereas the CIS region attracted a net FDI of just above 4 percent of GDP   9
on  average  in  the  1992-2003  period.
6  These  figures  are  much  higher  than  in  developed 
economies, especially in the EU-15, which averaged less than 3 percent of GDP in the same 
period. 
 
In  most  transition  economies,  during  the  pre-transition  era  domestic  saving  rates  were 
exceptionally high. At the end of the 1980s the average saving rates of CEE, SEE and CIS 
were 32.9, 30.7 and 28.8 percent of GDP, respectively. These numbers are relatively high, 
especially given the EU-15 member states’ average saving rate of only some 20 percent of 
GDP in the same period.
7 However, saving rates within the transition economies differed 
widely, with Poland on top (42.7 percent) in 1989 and Tajikistan (12.5) and Kyrgyz Republic 
(13.1) at the bottom. Denizer and Wolf (2000) revealed three main factors which effected 
savings  in  the  pre-transition  era:  first  there  was  ‘planned’  savings  for  funding  ‘centrally 
planned’ investment. Second, the lack of consumer goods exposed limits on consumption 
below the desired levels and consequently induced so-called ‘involuntary savings’. Third, 
savings that were voluntary but driven by expectations of a systemic change, e.g.  reflecting 
expectations of the greater availability of goods.  
 
With the start of the transition process, the drop in domestic  saving rates was enormous. 
Schrooten and Stephan (2003) pointed out at least three important factors which should be 
taken into account: consumption constraint, the savings overhang inherited from the past and 
the  massive  uncertainty  at  the  beginning  of  the  transition  process  (high  inflation,  high 
unemployment, GDP decline etc.). However,  a relatively slow recovery has been noticed 
despite huge differences both between  and  within  the  group  of  transition  economies.  For 
example, saving rates in CEE have stabilized at around 20 percent of GDP (the highest in 
Czech Republic with around 26 percent, the lowest in Poland with around 15 percent) on 
average in recent years. On the other hand, in spite of significant saving rates improvements 
in CIS since 1998 they have recently remained quite low, at around 17 percent of GDP (the 
highest in Russia with around 32 percent, the lowest in Moldova with even a negative savings 
rate of around 12 percent).
8  
 
A decomposition of the external imbalance between savings and investment shows that the 
main  determinant  of  growing  current  account  deficits  has  been,  in  general,  a  remarkable 
increase in the average investment rate in CEE and a significant decline in the average saving 
rate in SEE and CIS in the 1992-2003 period. In fact, international comparisons (see Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin, 1996) suggest that low and falling saving rates  make  current account 
deficits  less  sustainable  and  potentially  make  the  economy  fragile.  Moreover,  the  trends 
presented above mainly suggests an intertemporal approach to the current account, where 
saving is primarily determined by intertemporal consumption smoothing which would predict 
a lower saving rate as private agents increase consumption today based on expectations of a 
higher income in the future. In the case of transition economies, in particular in the latter 
stages of the transition process, the recent liberalization of  financial markets and steadily 
                                                 
6 In the 2000-2003 period the most attractive economies for FDI in the CEE region were Slovakia and Czech 
Republic with an average net FDI of 8.8 and 8.5 percent of GDP, respectively. In the CIS region, the main 
attractions are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with an average of 13.6 and 9.1 percent of GDP, respectively, in the 
same period.       
7 The EU-15 average savings rate has remained stabilized at around 20 percent of GDP since then.   
8  Due  to  data  deficiencies,  it  is  hard  to  estimate  a  reliable  level  of  the  saving  rate  for  the  SEE  region. 
Nevertheless, according to the available data almost all economies in the region have relatively low or even 
negative saving rates.      10
improving  access  to  credit  by  the  domestic  private  sector  might  be  confronted  with  a 
declining saving rate as uncertainty becomes reduced and liquidity constraints are eased.
9  
 
Figure 2:   Average domestic savings and investment in transition economies,  
1992-2003 (in percentage of GDP; unweighted average) 
 

































































Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
 
3.2. Fiscal imbalances in transition economies 
 
At the beginning of the transformation process fiscal policy had an important role in replacing 
the decline in private consumption which had appeared as a consequence of the collapse of 
output.  Government  expenditure  in  most  transition  economies  in  1992  was  significantly 
higher than in market economies with comparable levels of per capita GDP (in purchasing 
power  parity  terms),  sometimes  more  than  ten  percentage  points  of  GDP  higher. 
Consequently,  most  transition  economies  implemented  major  fiscal  reforms,  some  more 
successfully than others. In the early stage of the transition the need for major fiscal reforms 
was generally underestimated. The emphasis was more on the need for rapid privatization and 
‘getting the state out of the economy’; the need to reform state structures and the public 
administration in order to perform their very different but crucial roles in a market economy 
received less attention until a number of fiscal crises emerged (UN Economic Commission 
For  Europe,  2000).  Nevertheless,  more  recently  practically  all  transition  economies  have 
admitted the need for totally new systems requiring not only new tax laws but also new fiscal 
institutions, new skills, technical knowledge, and political capital.       
 
Within the transition process economic reforms have taken place with damaging impacts on 
existing  public  finances.  First,  by  the  destruction  of  central  plans  and  the  elimination  of 
information on quantities of goods produced and their prices. Consequently, the government 
had to rely on other sources, including taxpayers’ declarations that increased tax evasion. 
                                                 
9 Rodrik (2000) estimated that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of private credit to income lowers the 
long-term private saving rate by 0.74 of a percentage point in five CEE economies.   11
Second, the reforms dramatically increased the number of producers and thus of potential 
taxpayers. In fact, the large state enterprises which once provided the bulk of tax revenue have 
been replaced by new, small and difficult-to tax private producers. Since a tax culture never 
developed  in  the  centrally  planned  economies,  people  reacted  with  hostility  to  the 
introduction of an explicit tax system. Finally, the economic reforms removed the restrictions 
on  payment  methods  that  had  existed  under  central  planning  when  all  payments  were 
channeled through the central bank. Accordingly, tax arrears and payments in the form of 
barter have grown, creating major difficulties for the new system (Tanzi, 1999).              
 
The patterns in public revenues and expenditure reflect local factors as well as the mixed 
advice transition economies received from Western economies and institutions such as the 
IMF and the WB. An analysis of the fiscal data of transition economies yields several stylized 
facts.  Most  importantly,  almost  all  transition  economies  went  through  a  dramatic  fiscal 
adjustment. In fact, the turnaround in fiscal imbalances has been especially remarkable for 
CIS economies which reduced their average deficits from an average of 8.8 percent of GDP in 
the 1992-1997 period to a moderate fiscal deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP in the 1998-2003 
period (see Table 1). The extent of this fiscal adjustment in CIS is more than twice as much as 
that of SEE economies whose average deficit was reduced from 5.9 percent of GDP to 3.9 
percent of GDP in the same period. These fiscal imbalance trends were the outcome of a 
major revenue shock at the start of transition. For many CIS economies, independence from 
the Soviet Union also meant the loss of large fiscal transfers from Moscow which further 
compounded declines in government revenues from the recession and the flawed tax system 
with  its  weak  administration.
10  Consequently,  the  CIS’  average  budget  revenues  declined 
from 29.3 percent of GDP in 1992 to 24.1 percent of GDP in 2003. 
 
The sudden loss of control over  state resources in CIS economies forced governments to 
sharply cut expenditures. In fact, the average expenditure for CIS economies fell from about 
43.8 percent of GDP in 1992 to 25.0 percent of GDP in 2003. In some cases, the expenditure 
cuts  were  dramatic,  as  in  Tajikistan  and  Armenia  where  general  government  expenditure 
declined from the CIS’ highest levels of 65.7 percent and 46.7 percent of GDP in 1992 to the 
CIS’ lowest levels of 15.6 percent and 18.9 percent of GDP, respectively. Accordingly, as the 
transition process progressed, especially after the Russian (financial) crisis of 1998, the fiscal 
balances of CIS economies improved in large part due to the boom in energy prices which 
positively  effect  CIS  energy  exporting  economies  as  well  as  due  to  revenue  collection 
improvements,  expenditure  restraints  and  the  more  prudent  management  of  external  debt 
reflecting the ‘lesson of the Russian crisis’.       
 
Contrary to the CIS and SEE fiscal imbalance trends, CEE economies started with much 
lower average fiscal deficits, averaging out at 1.8 percent of GDP in 1992-1997 and even 
deteriorating  to  an  average  3  percent  of  GDP  in  1998-2003,  generally  as  a  result  of 
maintaining relatively high government expenditure shares (an average of 38.3 percent of 
GDP in the 1998-2003 period) and a moderate decline of government revenues in the period 
(e.g.  in  Czech  Republic  and  Poland  by  more  than  ten  structural  points  in  the  1992-2003 
period)  (see  Table  1).  An  important  measure  to  deal  with  the  revenue  shortfall  was  the 
adoption of value-added tax (VAT). The rate initially adopted has generally been reduced, and 
in most CEE states VAT now provides about the same proportion of total fiscal revenue as in 
most Western European states (i.e. 15 to 25 percent). Moreover, a number of CEE and SEE 
                                                 
10 For example, in 1992 both Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic lost transfers from Moscow which were 
equivalent to about 18 percent of GDP in 1991 (see Alam and Sundberg, 2002).    12
economies have introduced, or are in the process of introducing, uniform personal income 
taxes.  
 
As mentioned above, the recent worsening budgetary performance in CEE economies marks a 
d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  m o s t  C I S  a n d  S E E  e c o n o m i e s .  H o w e v er,  in  some  CEE 
economies  (e.g.  Estonia  –  increasing  government  revenues,  and  Lithuania  –  declining 
government expenditures) a relatively significant improvement in the fiscal balance has been 
seen in recent years. While most CEE economies are clustered in a narrow band there are 
extremes, for example Czech Republic’s overall budget in 2003 posted the highest deficit 
among all transition economies of 6.6 percent of GDP while Estonia posted a surplus of 1.7 
percent  of  GDP.  Nevertheless,  when  one  looks  at  the  change  in  primary  balances  CEE 
economies  generally  maintained  the  average  balance  of  their  primary  budget,  while  CIS 
economies  drastically  reduced  their  large  deficits  in  the  1992-2003  period  since  interest 
expenditure  were  growing  in  the  same  period.  However,  despite  the  declining  share  of 
expenditure in GDP, real public expenditure has been rising in many transition economies due 
to the relatively high GDP growth. Therefore, the fiscal reform process in the region consists 
more of ensuring that the budget process continues to require the necessary instruments for 
increasing efficiency, in the course of which further control over expenditure is likely to 
provide savings. In addition, less government interventions in the market, further reductions 
of  budget  deficits  and  structural  reform  of  public  finance  remain  important  targets  of 
economic policy in most transition economies.  
 
Overall,  in  view  of  the  uncertainties  regarding  saving  and  investment  behavior  (see 
subchapter 2.1.1.), the role of fiscal policy needs to have a built-in degree of flexibility to 
counterbalance potential saving-investment imbalances and the vulnerability implied by large 
external current account deficits. However, for the CEE economies the European Union has 
placed an emphasis on low budget deficits but at the same time it requires the adoption of a 
number of relatively costly social program and structural measures, which places upward 
pressure on government expenditure. Moreover, in light of the forthcoming adoption of the 
euro in many CEE economies the Maastricht fiscal deficit criteria should be reconsidered as 
these economies might risk hampering the development of baldy needed infrastructure and 
achieving the so-called ‘Golden Rule capital-labor ratio’.
11 Nevertheless, the sustainability of 
an economy’s fiscal balance has important implications for the sustainability of its external 
position. In transition economies, sizable fiscal deficits have generally not been offset by 
higher private saving and have consequently been reflected in large current account deficits 
(see Figure 2). In fact, for many economies in transition government budget deficits have 
been financed in large measure through external borrowing in a foreign currency, with most 
of the outstanding stock of external debt in each country being owed by the government. In 
reality, sizable external borrowing to finance productive investment may be appropriate when 
large potential returns from investment are expected and confronted with the relatively high 
cost of domestic finance. However, some governments in transition economies like Kyrgyz 
Republic and Serbia and Montenegro with an external debt of around 100 percent of GDP 
have recently largely turned to external borrowing to finance their current expenditures, such 
                                                 
11 The ‘golden rule’ is the level of capital-labor ratio that maximizes consumption per worker in the steady state. 
Kandogan (2004) set out that capital-labor ratios in transition economies significantly lag behind those of the 
EU-15 economies. For example, Germany has a capital-labor ratio that is  more than 2.5 times  higher than 
Slovenia, 5 times higher than Slovakia and around 12 times higher than Bulgaria and Latvia.    13
as paying off wage and pension arrears and to retire domestic debt, while using non-recurrent 
revenues such as those arising from privatization to reduce government budget imbalances.
12    
 
 
4. The Empirical Framework 
 
4.1. Empirical methodology 
 
The aim of the empirical research is to identify the medium-term impact of two important 
determinants of current account deficits in transition economies in the 1990-2003 period. 
Following equation (2) and previous theoretical and empirical studies of Chinn and Prasad 
(2000), Calderon et al. (2002), Fidermuc (2003) and Bussière and Müller (2004), we estimate 
a model which may be expressed in the following general form:  
 
     C A it = αi  +  γt +  β'xit  +  εit  ,         ( 3 )  
 
where the dependent variable is the current account balance (CA) (negative values indicate a 
deficit) for the i-th unit at time t and the vector of independent variables, (xi) includes the 
general  government  budget  balance  (GB)  and  investment  rate  (I). α i  represent  individual 
effects which are specific to individual economies, the vector  β' is a vector of regression 
coefficients,  γt  denotes  time-specific  effects  which  are  peculiar  to  a  particular  period  but 
constant for all economies and the error term εit represents the effects of the omitted variables 
that are peculiar to both the individual units and time periods.  
 
According  to  the  previous  theoretical  and  empirical  considerations,  we  expect  a  positive 
relationship between the current account balance and the fiscal balance. On the other hand, a 
negative  effect  is  expected  in  the  case  of  the  investment  rate.  Moreover,  statistically 
significant results would lead to some further conclusions. If there is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between CA and GB, this should provide some support for the ‘twin 
deficits  phenomenon’  in  the  region.  Besides,  a  statistically  significant  and  low  negative 
relationship  CA  with  I  would  provide  some  evidence  of  the  so-called  Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle. According to the empirical results, appropriate economic policy implications for the 




We estimate model (3) on the basis of pooled cross-sectional and time-series (panel) data for 
transition  economies  in  the  1990-2003  period,  where  time  series  for  particular  transition 
country begins in the year when the most serious stabilization attempt was performed (t=1). 
The data set comes from the EBRD Transition Reports, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and covers the 27 transition economies, i.e. 
eight CEE, seven SEE and twelve CIS economies. Our estimates are based on unbalanced 
panel data while for some economies included in the sample data were unavailable for the 
whole period. The dependent variable is a current account balance (CA), expressed as a ratio 
                                                 
12  One  of  the  most  important  problematic  aspects  of  public  finance  in  many  transition  economies  is  the 
increasing strain exerted by the pension system, based on a pay-as-you-go system. Due to its unsustainability, 
several CEE economies have already moved to raise the retirement age and to supplement the public retirement 
system with a multi-pillar system. On the other hand, the majority of CIS economies face less of a public sector 
burden with regard to retirement costs because the level of government-promised retirement benefits is lower 
(Svejnar, 2001).    14
to GDP (negative values indicate a deficit). Independent variables are the general government 
budget balance (GB) as measured by the general government budget balance and investment 
(I) by gross capital formation, both expressed as a percentage of GDP. Since the economies 
considered here are different sizes and differ in other characteristics, we perform three tests 
that specify the properties of the data set (see Table 2). The empirical results are summarized 
in the next section where we estimate model (3). The partial correlations coefficient and 
empirical results of the model (3) are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  
 
 
4.3. Empirical results  
 
4.3.1.  Testing  for  panel  heteroscedasticity,  correlations  across  economies  and  serial 
correlation of the model specification 
 
As  heterogeneity  is  the  main  characteristic  of  the  economies  under  consideration,  other 
specifications might be preferred to a simple OLS specification in our analysis. In fact, in the 
case  of  the  transition  economies  this  argument  is  plausible  once  the  differences  like 
macroeconomic conditions and structural reforms are taken into account. The Breusch-Pagan 
LM test confirms the appropriateness of the model based on panel data in all cases (except for 
SEE). Therefore, we extended the benchmark OLS model, adding both country effects and 
time effects. Moreover, Hausman’s test indicates that for all samples of transition countries 
the random-effect model (REM) provides a better specification.
13  
 









































Serial correlation (LM) 










Note: the probability of rejecting H0 is presented below the corresponding coefficient. 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
To be exact, Green (1997) pointed out that panel data typically exhibit a serial correlation, 
cross-sectional correlation, and group-wise heteroscedasticity. In order to confirm these facts, 
we first applied a modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity to check for common 
variance in the panels. Critical values of Chi- squared with 7, 6, 11 and 26 degrees of freedom 
at a 1-percent significance level are 18.48, 16.81, 24.73 and 45.64 which are considerably 
lower  than  the  test  values  obtained.  Hence,  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of 
homoscedasticity across the panels due to the different characteristics of the countries under 
consideration. Second, the contemporaneous or cross-sectional correlation is tested with a 
Breusch-Pagan LM test. As already presented above, according to the critical values of Chi-
squared only in the case of the SEE countries is a rejection of the null hypothesis of no cross-
sectional correlation impossible.  Third, all estimations reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
                                                 
13 Green (1997) stressed that REM is the appropriate one if we believe that sampled cross-sectional units are 
drawn from a large population.    15
correlation. In fact, critical values of Chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom at a 0.5-percent 
significance level are equal to 7.88.  
 
To sum up, the results of the tests presented above reveal there is panel heteroscedasticity, 
cross-sectional correlation (except in the SEE region) and serial correlation of the error terms 
in each transition group. Therefore, REM and pooled OLS specifications are preferred in CEE 
and SEE, respectively. Moreover, in the case of more countries than annual observations per 
country, as in the group of CIS countries and all transition countries as a whole, Beck and 
Katz (1996) propose the use of ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors 
(OLS-PCSE).
14   
 
4.3.2. Results of the model 
 




Note: **, * denotes significance at the levels of 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Source: author's calculations. 
 
As already shown in the previous chapters, the descriptive statistics show a negative external 
and fiscal balance for the majority of analyzed transition countries in the 1990-2003 period. 
                                                 
14 A potential concern in our model (3) specification is the endogeneity of some explanatory variables, reflected 
in correlation between these variables and error term causing biased and inconsistent estimates. In fact, budget 
deficits could be influenced by investments. According to Green (1997), as lagged values of budget deficits are 
relatively  highly  correlated  to  their  contemporaneous  values  and  relatively  independent  of  current  account 
deficits, one-year-lagged values of budget deficit is used as instrument. Nevertheless, the results are principally 
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However, there is mixed evidence on the relationship between the fiscal and external balance 
in  particular  groups  of  transition  countries  as  well  as  within  groups.  In  line  with  the 
theoretical  expectations,  the  partial  correlation  coefficient  shows  a  positive  and  moderate 
correlation with  the  government  budget  balance  for  all  transition  countries  in  the  sample 
(0.50). To be exact, the (statistically significant) relations between the current account and the 
fiscal balance for CEE, SEE and CIS are 0.39, 0.56 and 0.46, respectively. Nevertheless, the 
partial  correlation  coefficients  vary considerably  within  each  group.  Namely,  within  CEE 
countries the partial coefficient ranges from -0.39 in Slovenia to 0.79 in Slovakia, within SEE 
from -0.70 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 0.86 in Serbia and Montenegro, and within the CIS 
from -0.28 in Tajikistan to 0.79 in Russia.
15 These results further confirm the suggestion on 
the deployment of models which account for parametric heterogeneity. 
 
Greater consistency is seen when considering the partial correlation between current account 
and investment rates, where the theoretically expected coefficient (negative and statistically 
significant) signs are found in CEE (-0.52) and the CIS (-0.22), but a positive (and statistically 
insignificant) sign is found in SEE. In the great majority of transition countries the partial 
coefficient  signs  are  negative  and  statistically  significant.  Not  surprisingly,  the  highest 
negative correlation is found within CEE countries where more than half of the group (Czech 
R., Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia) achieved a correlation coefficient of around 
0.70 or more, implying extremely high degree of integration of their domestic economy to the 
international capital markets. A similar but slightly weaker negative correlation is found in 
CIS countries where half of the group countries attained a correlation coefficient of around 
0.60 or more. On the other hand, within SEE only Bosnia and Herzegovina (-0.97), Bulgaria 
(-0.92)  and  Croatia  (-0.74)  have  substantially  high  and  statistically  significant  partial 
correlation coefficients.     
 
Further, in Table 4 estimates of the OLS, FEM, REM and OLS-PCSE model specifications of 
the model (3) are presented. First, we investigated whether the impact of fiscal policy on the 
current account differs across transition regions. The results suggest that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the government budget deficit is associated on average with a 0.87 of a percentage 
point increase in the current account deficits-to-GDP ratio, with everything else being equal. 
These empirical results are significantly higher in comparisons to the results of Fidermuc 
(2003),  Zanghieri  (2004),  and  Chinn  and  Prasad  (2003)  for  a  sample  of  developing 
economies.  The  coefficient  estimate  suggests  that  in  transition  countries  private  savings 
provide  extremely  low  Ricardian  offset  to  changes  in  public  saving.  In  fact,  increases  in 
private saving, as a ratio to GDP, by about 0.1 of a percentage point is expected when the 
ratio of government saving to GDP decreases by 1 percentage point.
16    
 
When investigating each particular group of transition countries we found that the effect of 
fiscal policy on the current account was significantly higher in SEE and CIS countries. The 
estimated coefficients on the budget balance vary between 0.92-1.12 in SEE and between 
0.89-1.27 in CIS, depending on the model specifications. On the other hand, in CEE countries 
there is lower, but still moderate and statistically significant relationship between the budget 
deficit and the current account deficit (between 0.44-0.76). These results suggest that the SEE 
                                                 
15 The theoretically unexpected negative correlation coefficients are statistically insignificant at 10 percent and 
are the result of different factors such as political and economic instability (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Moldavia),  as  well  as  of  data  deficiencies  (e.g.  short  time-series)  and  other  statistical  issues  (like  Slovenia 
synchronizing the fiscal year with the calendar year in 2002).  
16 This finding contradicts to Edwards’ (1995) result for developing economies and to Jiang’s (2000) results for 
selected CEE economies.      17
and  CIS  countries  are  generally  confronted  with  underdeveloped  and/or  highly  regulated 
financial markets (see Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1996). Overall, relatively strong evidence for 
the twin deficits is found in CEE (particularly in Slovakia, Lithuania and Czech R.) and SEE 
(e.g. Albania and Romania). On the other hand, less liquidity constraints that are likely to be 
prevalent in CEE countries due to their generally more developed financial systems imply 
some evidence of Ricardian offset in the region as a whole, albeit with some exceptions (in 
particular  Slovakia,  Lithuania  and  Poland).  Nevertheless,  when  interpreting  the  empirical 
results data deficiencies and other caveats concerning transition countries should be taken into 
account.  
 
Table 4: Model (3) Estimations for Transition Countries, 1990-2003  
(Dependent Variable: CA) 
 
 


































2  0.35  0.69  0.67  0.59
 
No. of countries  8  8  8  8 
No. of obs.  99  99  99  99 
LM test  30.06
*** 
Hausman’s test  (χ2)  0.72 
 


























2  0.33  0.30  0.27  0.29
 
No. of countries  7  7  7  7 
No. of obs.  67  67  67  67 
LM test  0.12 
Hausman’s test  (χ2)  1.72 
 

























2  0.22  0.41  0.40  0.28 
No. of countries  12  12  12  12 
No. of obs.  116  116  116  116 
LM test  103.3
*** 






























2  0.25  0.31  0.31  0.23 
No. of countries  27  27  27  27 
No. of obs.  282  282  282  282 
LM test  81.0
*** 
Hausman’s test  (χ2)  13.8 
   18
 
Notes:   ***, **, * denotes significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient. 
 
Source:  author’s calculations. 
 
Finally,  our  model  (3)  also  includes  the  relationship  between  investment  and  the  current 
account balance. The reported coefficient for the transition region is relatively low (-0.16) and 
implies that around one-sixth of the increased investment rate is financed from international 
sources. This feature confirms the partial evidence of the so-called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle 
in the region.
17 Moreover, this result contradicts the findings for selected European countries 
included in the analysis by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), where the majority of investment 
is financed from international sources. Actually, the CEE and CIS regions show moderate and 
statistically significant coefficients with -0.32 and -0.26, respectively, which are similar to the 
results for OECD countries and ten new EU member states (see of Bussière et al (2004)). 
Indeed, the results confirm gradual capital market liberalization, the avoidance of restrictions 
on currency payments, the avoidance of discriminatory currency practices and convertibility 
of foreign-held balances in the region (particularly in the CEE) in the last decade. In addition, 
SEE  as  a  whole  has  a  relatively  low,  (theoretically  unexpected)  positive  and  statistically 
insignificant coefficient, which prevent us to reject the possible existence of the Horioka-





Fiscal  deficits  have  frequently  induced  current  account  unsustainability  and  consequently 
helped a balance of payments (currency) crisis to emerge worldwide. Therefore, the article 
considers the fiscal balance and its influence on the current account, as well as the role of 
investment,  in  the  medium  term  for  transition  countries.  Generally,  the  empirical  results 
suggest that a decrease in public savings of 1 percentage point lowers overall savings and 
contributes to the deterioration of external imbalances by about 0.9 and 1.0 of a percentage 
point in CIS and SEE, respectively. In these countries as a whole the substitutability between 
private and public savings is extremely low. Therefore, one of the most important elements of 
any  policy  reversal  to  raise  external  sustainability  in  these  countries  should  include  a 
substantial  reduction  of  the  fiscal  deficit,  particularly  in  terms  of  current  government 
expenditure. Similarly, but less intensive twin deficit phenomenon is found in CEE countries, 
where the presence of relatively higher substitutability between private and public sectors is 
identified. Hence, for all transition countries as a whole the increase in public savings will 
probably raise the overall savings rate and contribute to a reduction of external imbalances. In 
general terms, in these economies fiscal policy measures will be effective in terms of securing 
external sustainability.  
 
Moreover  the  empirical  results  also  suggest  that,  as  originally  claimed  by  Feldstein  and 
Horioka in their seminal paper, the intertemporal theory of the current account partly failed to 
explain the relationship between domestic saving and investment in transition countries. In 
particular, this holds for the CEE and CIS sub-samples where, on average, an increase in the 
investment rate by 1 percentage point increases the current account deficit by about 0.3 of a 
percentage point. On the other hand, the empirical results prevent us to reject the validity of 
the Horioka-Feldstein puzzle in the SEE region as a whole. Nevertheless, given the partial 
                                                 
17 Indeed, within the result of the regression coefficient of the model, (I/Y)it = αi + β' (S/Y) it + ε  i, shows a 
positive and statistically significant result at 0.54 for the whole transition region in the 1990-2003 period.    19
equilibrium nature of this theory isolating the idiosyncratic sources of fluctuations by taking 
the heterogeneous responses to investment to global shocks into account should be considered 
in  future  research.  Further,  due  to  the  relatively  high  heterogeneity  within  the  transition 
regions certain other econometric techniques, like time-series analysis, could be applied in 
future  empirical  investigations,  including  more  reliable  data,  in  order  to  provide  more 
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